In May, at the Association for Psychological Science session Often in Error, Rarely in Doubt, researchers presented findings showing that "Excessive confidence in the precision of one’s knowledge is both the most robust and the least understood form of overconfidence. This symposium investigates its ultimate causes. The evidence suggests that overprecision is caused by limitations on the working capacity in human memory, conversational norms, and social pressure."
Gold star. I must say, psychologists are pretty good at explaining their evidence to us regular folk. Their research abstracts, and even some of their academic papers, are actually understandable -- so kudos to them. Presentations at the Rarely in Doubt session included:
Overconfidence and the Representation of Uncertainty (Jack B. Soll, Duke University). "We compare uncertainty about repeatable cases (e.g., a random person’s weight) with uncertainty about specific cases (e.g., Rush Limbaugh’s weight). We find that perceptions of repeatable cases are noisy but accurate. In contrast, for specific cases people underestimate the variability around one’s best guess — they are overconfident in their answers."
Competing To Be Certain (But Wrong): Social Pressure and Overprecision in Judgment (Joseph R. Radzevick and Don A. Moore, Carnegie Mellon University and University of California, Berkeley). "We find that the competitive social pressure of a market contributes to overprecision among those competing for influence. When advisors must compete with each other, we find that the confidence they claim escalates over time. This overprecision helps advisors’ sell their advice."
Here's a draft of their paper (36-page pdf). The abstract says "Overly precise judgments claim more certainty than is objectively warranted. In this paper, we investigate whether the competitive social pressure of a market contributes to overprecision among those competing for influence. We find evidence that markets do indeed exacerbate overprecision. This evidence comes from two experiments in which advisors attempt to sell their advice. In the first experiment, advisors must compete with other advice sellers. In the second, advisors and decision makers are paired. Overprecision exists in both studies, and it helps advisors’ sell their advice."
New Scientist wrote a nice recap of Radzevick and Moore's findings in Humans Prefer Cockiness to Expertise, saying "The research... shows that we prefer advice from a confident source, even to the point that we are willing to forgive a poor track record.... [In] competitive situations, this can drive those offering advice to increasingly exaggerate how sure they are. And it spells bad news for scientists who try to be honest about gaps in their knowledge."
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